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                         Abstract 
    Ideological polarization is not a unique 
product of western politics. A national survey 
(2007-2014)  revealed that the overarching 
6
division in Chinese society is split between 
nationalism and cultural liberalism. Why does 
polarization happen in society where state 
ideology dominates the political apparatuses? 
This paper approaches this puzzle by 
examining the relationship between 
individuals’ media diet facilitated by media 
censorship policies and their ideology in China. 
The findings suggest that polarization as an 
outcome is caused by nationalists adhering to 
heavily state-controlled media, while liberals 
seek less censored resources. The findings also 
suggest that polarization as a process is due to 
the fact that agnostics who use the media 
mainly for learning purposes tend to stay or 
become nationalists, while agnostics who use 
media mainly for entertainment purposes tend 
to become liberals. 
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6 ​Chinese Political Compass (CPC). (n.d.). Retrieved 
from http://zuobiao.me 
 
  
 
  
                         Introduction 
    Political polarization does not exclusively 
exist in western politics characterized by 
partisan politics and fundamental disagreement. 
A national survey (Chinese Political Compass)  
7
conducted from 2007 to 2014 found that 
Chinese citizens are also polarized among a 
few issues that are ideologically connected. 
However, unlike Americans who are 
well-known to be polarized between liberalism 
and conservatism, Chinese citizens are found 
ideologically split between nationalism and 
cultural liberalism (Wu, 2014). Nationalism in 
China mainly means a “China-as-superpower” 
mindset and cultural liberalism is closely 
associated with “individual freedom and 
individual rights” values. These definitions are 
provided by previous research (Wu, 2014; J.Y. 
Wu, 2017) and confirmed by this study later 
through factor analysis. Notably,  ideological 
polarization in China is both a state and a 
process. That is, not only ideologues are not 
7 ​Supporting information (SI) is located at 
http://angelaxiaowu.com/files/IJoC_supporting_material
.pdf. 
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 willing to listen to each other but the agnostics 
in the middle have undergone fast dispersion to 
the extreme. Existing theories on this topic 
mainly focus on the political polarization in 
democratic states, are insufficient to explain the 
polarization happening in China,  thus this 
paper strives to find what factors might 
contribute to this ideological polarization 
phenomenon in Chinese society and how. Since 
it is commonly agreed that the polarization in 
China can be traced to the emergence of 
unofficial newspapers and media censorship 
does not come without cost (C.C.Lee, 1990; 
Elejalde et al, 2018; Li, 2016), this paper 
hypothesizes that this phenomenon is partially 
caused by the dual effects of media censorship 
policies.  
 
1. Background and Literature Review 
1.1. Media in China  
    The Chinese news media has traditionally 
served as the mouthpiece of the party-state 
since Maoist era. After Tiananmen Square 
Incident in 1989, the guidance of public 
opinion was singled out as a major concern of 
the party state. The state officially endorsed the 
idea of “taking positive propaganda as the main 
thrust” and avoid too much attention to 
sensitive news (Chan, 2007). Particularly, the 
state emphasizes the “correctness” of guiding 
public opinion and media serves to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the party. To fulfill its goal in 
“guiding” the public, the state closely controls 
the content appeared on media. As a result, 
Chinese media environment endures very strict 
censorship.  Media censorship means that any 
popular media in China should not openly 
challenge its political lines or policies. 
However, the degree of state censorship varies 
based on its relationship with the government 
and the nature of the media type, with the 
state-owned or state-funded media bearing the 
most intensive censorship while giving some 
leeway to other media resources. Scholars 
found that while the media censorship policies 
to some extent strengthen state support, they 
simultaneously alienate the “active readers” 
who witnessed the  information gap reported by 
different media sources (Lei, 2011). 
    Ideological polarization is defined as the 
polarization over “a configuration of ideas and 
attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or 
functional interdependence” (Converse, 1964). 
Prior studies approach the puzzle of ideological 
polarization mainly through two directions-- 
individuals’ internal biased 
information-processing habits and the external 
forces posed by political campaigns or media in 
shaping individuals’ attitudes. ​Selective 
Exposure ​and ​Negative​ ​Campaigning ​  are the 
most eminent theories respectively. In addition, 
ever since the popularization of internet, many 
scholars also consider internet use as a factor 
that triggers and facilitates ideological 
polarization.  
 
1.2.1 Polarization and Selective Exposure 
    Selective exposure occurs when individuals 
exhibit bias in their information consumption 
patterns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 
1944). Stroud (2008) found that media users 
tend to allocate a disproportionate amount of 
their news diet to attitude-consistent content 
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 while intending to avoid attitude-discrepant 
content. He also provided compelling evidence 
suggesting that selective exposure, made worse 
by the rise of new media, including cable 
television and the internet, contributes to 
affective polarization. The media influence 
individual opinion though a number of 
techniques such as issue-framing, 
agenda-setting, constructing reality (Bourdieu, 
2001), emphasizing identity (Mills, 1956), etc. 
There are at least three reasons that explain 
why selective exposure encourages affective 
polarization. First, according to Iyengar’s 
social identity theory (2012), selective 
exposure leads to perceived polarization via 
activating partisan identities, which are 
characterized by positive evaluations of the 
in-group and negative evaluations of the 
out-group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). Second, 
according to Bandura’s affective learning 
theory (2001),citizens often turn to “elite cues” 
for developing and refining their own political 
attitudes (Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999; 
Zaller, 1990).  When exposed to partisan news 
where out-parties are denigrated and attacked, 
people have the tendency to learn and mimic 
the negative emotions on display (Jamieson & 
Cappella, 2008). Third, attitude rehearsal 
theory suggests that the more one thinks about 
an attitude object, the more polarized one’s 
attitudes become (Tesser & Leone, 1977). 
 
1.2.1 Polarization and Negative Campaigning   
    Candidates routinely spend more time 
attacking​ their opponents than promoting 
themselves (Geer 2010). Negative messages are 
recycled ad infinitum by journalists who seek 
conflict and controversy above all else. 
Coverage of advertising has become a staple 
feature of news, so much so that the 2004 Swift 
Boat ad impugning Senator Kerry’s Vietnam 
War record generated more news stories than 
the war in Iraq (Geer 2010). Also, suggested by 
Iyengar (2012), since individuals typically 
categorize themselves into multiple groups, an 
important question concerns the hierarchy of 
group affiliations. In the case of party 
identification, for instance, we might expect 
strong partisans to carry more biased 
perceptions of their opponents. Therefore, 
negative campaigning exacerbates polarization 
through heightening the salience of partisan 
identity among all other identifiers. Iyengar et 
al. (2012) provide compelling evidence 
implicating negative campaign advertising. 
They pointed out that during the 2004 and 2008 
U.S. presidential elections individuals living in 
battleground states, who presumably had 
extensive exposure to political advertising, 
exhibited greater affective polarization and 
polarized more rapidly over the election period 
than individuals in other states. Most recently, 
Lelkes, Iyengar, and Sood (2013) find that after 
the debut of the conservative-leaning Fox News 
channel in 1996, access to cable television in 
the U.S. was associated with higher levels of 
affective polarization among Republicans.  
 
1.2.3. Polarization and Internet Use 
   Despite their prominence, these two theories 
seem insufficient to explain the polarization 
happening in China. After all, there is no party 
competition in China, and with information 
censorship Chinese citizens can not submerge 
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 themselves into news they like. Scholars who 
see this then attribute the reasons for 
polarization to the popularity of internet. 
    Given the Chinese state’s firm control in 
traditional media, the Internet has been 
expected to bring about political and social 
change in China since its introduction (Lei, 
2011). The internet has facilitated the rise of 
online public opinion and promotes a broad 
discussion about the contemporary public 
sphere in China (Stockmann et al. 2017). As 
Tai and Sun (2007) noted that information is 
not easily available from the Chinese 
mainstream media and the significance of the 
Internet is that it allows audiences get rid of 
traditional media dependencies and to create 
information by being both producers and 
disseminators. Studies found that Chinese 
netizens users are more politically opinionated 
(Le, Y., & Yang, B. 2009). In addition, they are 
more likely to be simultaneously supportive of 
the norms of democracy and critical about the 
party-state and the political conditions in 
China. Therefore, those scholars believe that 
internet use facilitates polarization in China by 
bringing liberal ideas to Chinese society and 
enabling liberal conversations. 
    However, this paper takes the position 
internet use theory is not sufficient to explain 
the polarization in China either. Scholars tend 
to neglect that unlike democratic societies 
where structure of the online media 
environment much mirrors the off-line division 
in politics (Hindman, 2009), in China, the 
Internet also bears state censorship, given the 
degree of censorship is clearly less than state 
official media, leading to relative freer 
expression of opinion and freer flow of 
information (Zhao, 2010). In addition, with the 
popularization of smartphones, people’s 
reading habits changed and most state-owned 
and fund media went digital. Today, internet is 
more of a platform rather than a single factor 
that can potentially affect people’s ideology. 
However, this paper does agree with the 
logistics of the internet use theory, that shying 
away from traditional state-controlled media 
might help people to construct different 
ideology. 
 
2. Hypotheses:  
    This paper hypothesizes that the current state 
of polarization in China, ​people being polarized 
over a few issues​, is partially ​caused by 
people’s different media diet when learning 
about political knowledge. Due to the 
information censorship policies, it is clear that 
most state-owned and state-funded media are 
saturated with nationalistic values. This media 
environment allow nationalists to strengthen 
their attitudes but it does not come without 
cost. For people who witness the information 
gap between different media sources might 
suspect the authenticity of tightly state-owned 
media and escape to other media sources. Note 
to mention, this paper takes the position that it 
is people that actively choose media sources 
which fit their ideology rather than the content 
of media influences people’s ideology. After 
all, there are no such “liberal” media sources in 
China, only the less censored ones.  
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 H1:​ The more nationalistic one is, the more 
likely s/he uses tightly state-controlled media to 
learn politics. 
H2: ​The more liberal one is, the more likely 
one s/he uses loosely state-controlled media to 
learn politics.  
 
    Polarization in China is both a state and a 
process. Wu ( 2013) found that, the fast 
decrease of agnostics, which amounts to the 
thinning of the middle position holders, 
contributes to overall polarization. So, what 
turns those agnostics into ideologues and how? 
This paper hypothesizes that the development 
of polarization is related to the purpose of 
individuals’ use of media. This hypothesis is 
based on the findings of Wojcieszak and Mutz 
(2009) which suggest that the potential for 
deliberation occurs where politics comes up 
only incidentally, but is not the central purpose 
of the discussion space. That is to suggest that 
among agnostics, those who use media mainly 
for learning purposes are potential to become 
nationalists while those who use media mainly 
for entertainment purposes are potential to 
become liberals. Drawing on the above reasons, 
this paper thus formulates two further 
hypotheses.  
H3: Nationalists are more likely to use media 
for learning purposes than are agnostics. 
H4: Liberals are more likely to use media for 
entertainment purposes than are agnostics. 
 
3. Method  
3.1. Data resources 
    ​This study collected its survey data (N=583) 
through Qualtrics anonymously in China. The 
study is self-administered. The link to the 
questionnaire was initially distributed from the 
researcher’s personal social media account and 
disseminated through friends and relatives to a 
larger pool of participants.  
 
3.2. Measurements 
 
3.2.1 ​Ideology ​--nationalism versus liberalism 
(Independent variable of H1 and H2) 
    To estimate a participant’s ideology, this 
study borrows the statements of the Chinese 
Political Compass, a Chinese version of online 
political ideological self-assessment. The 
Chinese Political Compass consists of dozens 
of statements, programmed to return scores of 
ideological leanings based on participants’ 
attitudes toward individual statement. For the 
questionnaire, this study borrows 9 statements 
regarding nationalism and 9 statements 
regarding cultural liberalism. See Appendix for 
the full questionnaire. 
    ​After factor analysis, I decided to retain only 
six of these statements that are most closely 
associated within each category as the direct 
reflection of individual’s ideology. For 
nationalism, the factors include national leader 
image, military training, national integrity, 
national interests, reunification of Taiwan and 
current political system. This paper considers 
these 6 factors closely associated with 
“China-as-super”mindset which confirms the 
definition of nationalism provided by previous 
research (Wu 2013). Therefore, this paper only 
use participants’ scores on these 6 states to 
assimilate their degree of nationalism. 
Similarly, this paper only uses another 6 
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 statements to assess respondents’ degree of 
liberalism and the remained items are believed 
all relate to individual rights and individual 
freedom, which again confirms previous 
studies definition of liberalism. In other words, 
in China, nationalism means a 
“China-as-superpower” mindset and liberalism 
mainly concerns individual freedom and 
individual rights. See Table 1 and Table 2. 
    The degree of a participant’s nationalism is 
scored from 0 to 1, with 1 being very 
nationalist and 0 being very un-nationalist. The 
score of a participant’s degree of nationalism is 
based on the average of his or her attitudes on 
all of the six statements regarding nationalism. 
Similarly, the score of a participant’s degree of 
cultural liberalism is based on the average of 
his attitudes on all of the six statements 
regarding cultural liberalism. The degree of a 
participant’s liberalism is scored from 0 to 1, 
with 1 being very liberal and 0 being very 
un-liberal.Note that this study does not 
automatically consider nationalism and 
liberalism as natural opposites. Each participant 
is given two scores for his degree of 
nationalism and liberalism based on different 
statement sets. In other words, potentially, a 
participant can be both a nationalist and a 
liberal.  
    This study defines nationalists as people 
whose scores regarding nationalism is higher 
than 0.671 and defines non-nationalists as 
people whose score is lower than 0.33. 
Similarly, this study defines liberals as people 
whose score regarding liberalism is higher than 
0.671 and non-liberals as people whose score is 
lower than 0,33. The rest of people are those 
who do not generate any preference over either 
nationalist values or liberals values. The 
intersection of moderate in nationalism and 
moderate in liberalism is defined as the 
“agnostics”. There are in total 127 agnostics 
out of the 583 participants. These people are 
specifically examined by this research. See 
table 4. 
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3.2.2. individual’s media diet-- tightly vs. 
loosely censored media (dependent variable of 
H1 and H2) 
    This paper classifies media resources based 
on the degree of state-censorship one bears. 
Studies show that the deeper state-censorship, 
the more nationalistic the news resources tend 
to be. Based on this standard, this paper 
classify news resources in China into four 
groups and the degree of censorship decreases 
successively --state official media eg: CCTV; 
for-profit commercial news portal (eg:Baidu 
News); social media eg: (Wechat): overseas 
media eg: (New York Times). State official 
media receives the most censorship and 
become the most nationalist while overseas 
media receives almost no censorship and are 
the most progressive media resources. For 
profit news portal, by the time this research is 
conducted, two facts came to mind. Many big 
news portals such as  Baidu, Sohu etc. have 
officially announced their advocacy of party 
policies and Fenghuang news, the well known 
more progressive news portal was ordered by 
the government to “self-regulate” . These facts 
8
signal state’s strengthening censorship over big 
news portals, thus I classify it as the tightly 
state-censored media type. Social media and 
overseas media altogether are considered as 
loosely state-controlled media due to their 
discursive nature. Admittedly, the classification 
of media types is not absolute and is based on 
this researcher’s own evaluation but its 
confirmed through a pretest. See Table 5. 
 
3.2.3. Ideology -- Ideologues vs. Agonistics 
(Independent Variable of H3 and H4) 
    Ideologues are nationalists and liberals and 
the classification is the same as mentioned 
above. Agnostics are defined as lying of the 
intersection of moderates in nationalism and 
moderates in liberalism. Those are people who 
do not show any consistent preference toward 
either liberalism or nationalism. There are 127 
agnostics out of the 583 participants. 
 
3.2.4. Purpose of Media Consumption -- 
Entertainment vs Learning (Dependent 
variable of H3 and H4) 
    ​For the purpose of media consumption, this 
paper offers five options -- entertainment, 
learning about political knowledge, learning 
others’ views, communication, and others. See 
the appendix for the full questionnaire. Among 
8 See 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship
-china 
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 these options,  entertainment or killing time is 
coded as entertainment purposes, while 
learning about political knowledge, learning 
others’ views and communicating with others 
are collectively coded as learning purposes. 
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
    583 individuals participated in this survey. 
Among those people, 41.9% are male, 58.1% 
are female. The national gender ratio is 53.5% 
male to 46.5% female.   It contains a relatively 
9
diverse age span, ranging from 18 to 70. The 
majority (66.5%) of the participants have at 
least college education. At the national level, 
only 9% of the total population has a college 
degree . See Figure 1-3. Therefore, the dataset 
10
is not representative at the national level, as it 
9 It is at birth ratio. 
 
10 This number is reported by last census in 2010. 
includes more female and well-educated 
participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Education N=583 
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     In terms of media diet, when asked about “if 
you want to learn about a particular political 
news or event, which type of media would be 
your primary choice?” Overall, about half of 
participants claim that they use state-owned 
and state-fund media as their primary media 
type to learn about politics, while the other half 
use less censored media types. It’s unexpected 
to see that only about 15% participants use 
social media, which is readily accessible to 
most Chinese due to the popularization of 
smartphones. See Figure 4. 
 
 
 
    In terms of the expectation of media 
consumption, most people claim that they use 
their declared media to learn about political 
knowledge, learn others’ views or 
communicate with others, what collectively 
refer to as “learning purposes”. On the other 
hand, 29.2% of the participants claim that they 
use the media mainly to entertain, referred as 
“entertainment purposes”. See Figure 5.  
 
  
   In terms of the assessment of credibility of 
different media sources, a large majority 
(85.1%) believes that the state official media is 
either credible or very credible, collectively 
refer to as credibility rate. Surprisingly, 
overseas media is considered the next credible 
sources (54.7%). The neutrality rate is the 
lowest for unofficial news portal. See Figure 6. 
 
    In terms of the assessment of neutrality of 
difference media sources, still a great majority 
considers state official media as very neutral or 
relatively neutral sources, collectively refer to 
as neutrality rate. The neutrality rate is lowest 
for unofficial news portal. See Figure 7. 
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    Respondents’ degree of liberalism and 
degree of nationalism are measured by different 
statements and lie along different dimensions. 
The findings confirm that in Chinese society, 
pro-nationalism does not directly translate to 
liberalism and vice versa. However, it is also 
very rare (around 10%) for one to be both a 
nationalist and a liberal. In fact, nearly half 
(48.9%) of the respondents are nationalist who 
remain moderate on liberal statements. See 
Figure 8. (eg: M-N & M-L refers to moderate 
in nationalism and moderate in liberalism.) 
Given liberals and nationalists are not natural 
antagonists, the finding also shows that the 
more liberal one is, the less likely one become 
a nationalist. See Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Ideology Distribution   N=582 
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4.2. Testing the hypotheses 
4.2.1. ​The overall finding confirms the H1: the 
more nationalistic one is, the more likely he or 
she uses tightly state-controlled media to learn 
about politics. Among non-nationalists, none of 
these repondants ever uses tightly state-censor 
media to learn about politics, 63% moderates 
use tightly state-censor media and 81% of 
nationalists use tightly state-controlled media. 
See Figure 10. 
 
 
Note: Phi value: .448; Approximate Significance: 000;  
Cramer’s V: .317; Approximate Significance: 000;  
 
4.2.2.​ The overall finding confirms H2: the 
more liberal one is, the more likely he or she 
uses loosely state-controlled media to learn 
about politics. Among non-liberals, only 7.1% 
of them use loosely state-censored media, 
25.9% of moderates use loosely state-censored 
media and 37.1% of liberals use loosely 
state-censored media. See Figure 11. 
Note: Phi value: .214; Approximate Significance: 001;  
Cramer’s V: .151; Approximate Significance: 001;  
 
4.2.3. ​The overall finding confirms both H3: 
nationalists are more likely to use media for 
learning purposes than agnostics and H4: 
liberals are more likely to use media for 
entertainment purposes than agnostics. Among 
liberals, 40.4% of them uses media for 
entertainment while 58.5% for learning 
purposes. Among agonistics, 35.1% is for 
entertainment while 64.5% is for learning 
purposes. Among nationalists, only 31.1% is 
for entertainment while 68.9% is for learning 
purposes. As indicated by Figure 12. 
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Note: for H3: Phi value: .315; App Sig: 000;  Cramer’s 
V: .223;  Approximate Significance: 000;  or H4: Phi 
value: .209; App Sig: 011;  Cramer’s V: .148; 
Approximate Significance: 011; 
 
5. Discussion  
    As indicated by Figure 4, given 
counterintuitive, nearly half of the participants 
use state official media as their primary media 
to learn about politics while less than one third 
use loosely regulated media such as 
commercial magazines, social media or 
overseas media. This finding shows that state 
official media still dominates people’s media 
diet in learning about politics in China. 
   As indicated by Figure 7 and Figure 8 , given 
the clear ideological affiliation of state-owned 
and state-fund media, participants still rank 
these tightly censored media types as the most 
credible and neutral media sources with respect 
to others. This finding suggests that the strategy 
of media censorship and the penetration of 
patriotic education worked in China.  
    Furthermore, in China, pro-nationalism does 
not directly translate to anti-liberalism and vice 
versa. However, only about ten percent of the 
participants are both liberals and nationalists 
based on this paper’s standard (score >0.67). 
The number is even smaller if we raise the bar. 
That means the extremists are generally 
mutually exclusive. A small majority of people 
are nationalists with moderates attitudes toward 
liberalism.  
    Given both liberals and nationalist exist in 
Chinese society, the numbers are uneven. More 
than half of the participants are able to possess 
consistent nationalistic values while only about 
10 percent are able to possess consistent liberal 
values. This finding supports Wu’s (2014) 
study that viewed chronically, it was a smaller 
liberal-oriented interpretive community that 
arise from the dense mainstream and soon 
become consolidated that construct the liberal 
community in China. Liberals in China are still 
considered a minority given their voice is high. 
    While nationalists in China generally adhere 
to nationalistic media, liberals in China, 
different from those liberals in western 
countries, are open to nationalistic values to a 
certain extent. However, compared with others, 
they are clearly more likely to use less censored 
media type where learning opinions different 
from what the state commonly endorses is 
possible. The reason might be that the media 
censorship policies which help penetrate 
nationalistic ideology also alienate people who 
can witness the information gap from accessing 
to less regulated or non-regulated media 
sources. Knowing that the state affiliated media 
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 speak for the party rather than for the truth 
leads them to seek for “different sources”.  
   DiMaggio et al. (1996) found that in the U.S. 
ideologues use the media to learn politics while 
agnostics use it mainly for entertainment 
purposes. This finding works differently for 
liberals and nationalists in China. In fact, in 
China, the more nationalistic one is, the more 
likely he or she is using news media for 
learning purposes while the more liberal one is, 
the more likely he or she is using it for 
entertainment purposes. This finding resonates 
Wu’s (2014) study that suggests liberalism in 
China came from entertainment. The reason 
might be that most Chinese grow up in a 
nationalistic educational setting and have 
strong predilections to uphold nationalistic 
values. When they actively use media to learn, 
they would hardly encounter any cross-cutting 
exchanges. Therefore, the use of media only 
strengthens their degree of nationalism. 
Meanwhile, when people use the media mainly 
for entertainment purpose, they may feel more 
comfortable to deliberate those cross-cutting 
liberal ideas that spilled over incidentally.  
6. Conclusion: 
    ​It is unexpected to see the formation of 
political polarization happening in an 
undemocratic regime where the state controls 
ideological apparatuses. This essay posits that 
the formation of ideological polarization in 
China occurs as a result of different media diet 
of people in learning politics. In other words, 
nationalists adhere to nationalistic news 
resources while liberals adhere to less regulated 
media sources. For media type, being less 
regulated per se does not mean being 
progressive. In fact, there is no “progressive 
media” in opposition of nationalistic media 
where people can learn liberal values. That’s 
the reason why this study concludes that most 
theories in western politics do not work for 
China’s situation. In other words, this paper 
posits that the reason liberals turn to less 
regulated sources is due to the side effects of 
media censorship policies. It is the dual effects 
of the information censorship that contribute to 
the current state of polarization. As for the 
process of polarization, that is why the 
agnostics in the middle constantly shift to the 
extreme, this finding confirms that it is due to 
different purpose of media consumption. That 
resonates Mutz’s study that potential for 
deliberation occurs where politics comes up 
only incidentally, but is not the central purpose 
of the discussion space. 
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